Introduction
Over the last years, knowledge-focussed explorations of conflicts and interventions have mushroomed. This is evidenced by a steep rise in the number of publications and of research groups and centres that have formed around the topic, contributing to the institutionalization of conflict knowledge/expertise as a field of research.
1 While the surge in conflict and intervention studies focussing on the role of experts and knowledge is relatively recent, however, in the discipline of International Relations (IR) this type of enquiry is not entirely new. Berling and Bueger (2016; based on Bueger 2014 ) distinguish the role that expertise has played in IR into three 'generations of research'. While the 'first generation intends to isolate experts as a distinct type of actor in world politics and aims at studying their causal influence', the 'second generation develops a broader understanding of expertise and shifts emphasis to language, rationalities and meanings'. The third generation, finally, focuses 'on the practices of expertise and how these are situated in various historical situations and material arrangements'.
The three generations of knowledge-related research in IR constitute a useful background for an overview of studies on knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict and intervention. Here, the first generation -studies that isolate experts as distinct actors and explore their influence on policymaking -comprises works, which look into the organisational structure, advocacy work and culture of conflict expert organisations such as think tanks (e.g. McGann and Sabatini 2011; Medvetz 2007 Medvetz , 2012 , or which study the influence of academic knowledge on statebuilding practitioners (e.g. Waldman 2014 ). Yet, works on strategic knowledge production as a central technique in diplomatic counter-insurgency, with their focus on specific actors and their aim to determine the course policymaking in intervention contexts outside of formal structures, may also be seen as part of such first-generation studies (e.g. Leroux-Martin 2014) .
Examples of the second generation of expert/knowledge studies about conflict and intervention -studies revolving around language, rationalities and meaning -are the works of Autesserre (2012) , Dunn (2003) and Koddenbrock (2014) , who focus on the discourses which constitute the type of international policy problem a conflictaffected country, here: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), is seen to pose and how the images and interpretations of 'the Congo' shape international interveners' actions. Studies focussing on myths as the part of political knowledge that 'goes without saying', such as Kühn's (2016a) and Goetze's (2016) studies of myth-making about Afghanistan and Afghan warlordism, respectively, also belong to this generation, as do works which try to uncover the hidden/local discourse behind, or paralleling, the dominant 'public transcripts' of international peacebuilding interventions (e.g. Heathershaw 2009; Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn 2015) .
Third-generation studies in the field of conflict/intervention comprise works that are focused on the epistemic practices of conflict knowledge production and expertise (e.g. Denskus 2014 , on peacebuilding conferences and research as ritual), or on the limiting effects that material structures and objects can have on our representations of conflict and intervention, such as Kosmatopoulos's (2014) study of the effects of the format of the crisis report on representations of violence in Lebanon (see also Smirl 2015; Kühn 2016b) . These generations are not clear-cut and many authors' studies straddle the analytical boundaries erected here. It can be argued, for instance, that Sending's (2015) work on expert authority in global governance with its basis in the Bourdieusian relational understanding of authority as recognition could be placed at the intersection of the second and third generations. Far from 6 doing justice to all the interesting works produced over the last years, this brief overview illustrates the wide variety of approaches existing in the field of knowledge/expertise on conflict and intervention, and to which the contributions in this special issue seek to make distinctive, thought-provoking contributions.
All articles assembled here start from an understanding of knowledge as socially constructed and as the result of distinct (discursive and non-discursive)
practices. While the authors do not deny the existence of a material conflict and intervention reality 'out there', nor that this reality can have substantial effects on ways of knowing (e.g. when access is difficult), they share the epistemological view that this reality can only be accessed through individual and inter-subjective interpretation. Engagement with conflict and intervention spaces is furthermore seen as mostly mediated, adding another filter between the material reality and the beholder. Beyond this shared understanding, and taking the contributions on their own terms, however, each author (team) pushes the boundaries of a specific, different aspect of the broad field of conflict knowledge and expertise studies.
Contributing to second-generation studies, David Lewis (2017) In a similar vein, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (2017) argues that politicians' travel to spaces of conflict and intervention need to be understood as an epistemic practice, which enables claims over authentic insights and knowledge on the basis of 'having been there' and forms the basis upon which expert status is ascribed to policymakers by peers and broader public. Bliesemann de Guevara claims that such visits are just one among many performative techniques in a wider struggle over the social construction of roles and problem definitions in democratic politics. By focusing on knowledge-producing practices of policymakers, her study upends conventional notions of who should be considered a knowledge producer in international politics, and it provides inroads to explaining the value attached to located knowledge, which qualifies the general finding that universal knowledge generally trumps located knowledge in intervention contexts.
The last two contributions take a more actor-centred perspective on the strategic side of knowledge production through management of access to the field and the manufacturing of strategic narratives, thereby suggesting new takes on firstgeneration knowledge/expertise studies. Jonathan Fisher (2017) Controlling access to these areas in conflict/intervention is thus as much or more in their interest as in the interveners', leaving the latter little choice in the matter.
In the final contribution, Roland Kostić (2017) offers a re-reading of the knowledge produced on the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the government crisis on 2010-11. He employs a diplomatic counter-insurgency lens to highlight the strategic side of knowledge production and policy narratives resorted to by different networks competing over dominance in the intervention process.
Kostić's article shows how a focus on informal networks and their strategic production/use of knowledge leads us to different interpretations of external interventions' courses and logics, thereby pushing the boundaries of intervention studies well beyond its liberal core. Yet, the contribution is also wary of interpreting too much power into such informal arrangements: the author shows how diplomatic counterinsurgency is ultimately bound to fail, when strategic narratives and actual practice diverge in incommensurable ways. To understand knowledge production in neoliberal times, we have to take into account the specific historic context of ideas and practices of making Western states surpassingly smaller, more efficient and more business-like, and the effects that this has had on policy knowledge producers. Guiding government policy in the UK and US since the 1980s, neoliberal ideas of new public management and the redesigning and privatisation of state bureaucracies gained global sway in the early 1990s (Monibot 2016; Sussman 2010, 13; Wedel 2009, 29) . Their stated objective has been to turn 'sluggish centralized bureaucracies, their preoccupations with rules and regulations and their hierarchical chains of command' into governments based on flat hierarchies, decentralized decision-making, productivity-enhancing technologies, quality and customer satisfaction, in response to information rich, knowledgeintensive society and the economy of the 1990s (Osborne 1992, 1; Osborne and Gaebler 1992) . In this process, different aspects of state functions have been privatised allowing for the expansion of global capitalism, while making bureaucracy more informal, multi-layered and diffuse (Sussman 2010; Wedel 2009 ). The outcome of neoliberal redesigning has been the state that functions as a network in which all nodes consisting of government and quasi-government entities interact and are equally necessary for the performance of the state's functions in relation to the demands of transnational capital (Castells 2011) .
Knowledge production in neoliberal times
The legitimisation and reproduction of the state are enacted through decentralisation and images of citizens' participation in non-governmental organisations, making them an essential part of the networked state (Carnoy and Castells 2001, 14) . At the same time, the privatisation of politics has displaced voluntary citizen engagement with corporate versions, which rely on networks of professional actors that straddle the boundary between business consultants, public opinion pollsters, PR specialists, and lobbyists (Sussman 2010, 16; Wedel 2009; Castells 2011b, 371; Suhonen 2014, 71-87; Shore and Wright 2003, 5) . Not surprisingly, the multiplication of policy knowledge producers and experts of all colours is one of the most acknowledged developments in global policymaking over the last two decades (Leander 2014) . The multiplication of actors has gone hand in hand with a democratisation of voices in the sense that there are no clear hierarchies of knowledge when it comes to a political issue. Lay persons who happen to be affected by a policy problem may be on par with scientists in the public perception of who is authorised to speak on a matter and whose contribution is judged as legitimate (Leander 2014; Morin and Orsini 2013) .
In terms of foreign and security policy, the neoliberal reinvention of the state has meant that the state has reserved the right to use military force, although many aspects of foreign policy as well as military and security tasks, including diplomacy and intelligence, have been subcontracted to private actors (Wedel 2009; Brand 2005; Bliesemann de Guevara 2014; Gentry 2015) . In this process, classic roles have become considerably blurred. For instance, it has been observed that contemporary US diplomats are seen as part-activists, part-lobbyist and part street-smart policy entrepreneurs, who rely on PR tactics such as opinion polls and focus groups to identify shared objectives, project images and build networks in order to ensure peaceful transitions, while reducing the cost of military interventions (Fouts 2006, 22 Informational technological revolution has played a major role in the processes of knowledge productions' proliferation and democratisation, since it has redefined not only how we communicate but also how we relate to facts and truth in a social reality which is perceived as increasingly complex (Wedel 2009; Monibot 2016; Sussman 2010, 8; Castells 2011a ). On the one hand, informational technologies, and especially the Internet and social media, have heightened the transparency of political processes in the sense of public visibility and scrutiny.
Access to different types and sources of information from all over the world has (Fukuyama 2016; Davies 2016) . In this environment, which has also been described as a 'knowledge market' (Rüb 2006) , knowledge-producing actors do not only have to engage in the formulation of convincing narratives about a policy.
They also need to engage in struggles over expert authority through self-narratives, performances of expertise and authenticity, practices of branding and, not least, reliance on broader formal and informal networks of experts and policymakers, through which they try gaining access to and influence on important decisions and elevating their versions of problems and solutions to a status of dominance. Global publics, norms and expectations provide the ideological background against which practices of narrating, branding and networking take place (Sending 2015) . To be successful in winning the battles of ideas, knowledge producers have to plug into prevalent global norms, such as human rights or just peace, because such norms provide a globalised blueprint for what is deemed legitimate political action at a given time and in a given setting (Koloma Beck and Werron 2013) . In this sense, ways of knowing and resulting bodies of knowledge are always historical and they are deeply political. This is not only true for the non-governmental policy experts advising policymakers, but just as much for conflict and intervention researchers in academia.
Conflict/intervention research in neoliberal times
The neoliberalisation of the state has also affected how universities are run today.
Practices of new public management have resulted in a redefinition of the role of universities in society, but also of the relationship between teachers and students (Olssen and Peters 2007) . Institutions of higher education are increasingly run as forprofit organisations, in which education is a good that is being sold, academics are the providers of services, and students are consumers with according rights (Lakes and Carter 2011) . While this affects countries to different degrees, with the UK and the US as trend-setters, while countries like Sweden and Germany have retained some of their welfare aspects of education, it is nonetheless a general trend across the whole sector.
Research is also increasingly under pressure to be useful to society to be seen as relevant and justified. In the UK, for instance, the impact agenda is part of the regular monitoring of universities' research output through the Research Excellence
The impact agenda is also pushed by major national research funding bodies. This also applies to Sweden, where bibliometrics are playing a growing role in assigning research grants and ensuring employability. Not least, this has an influence on the publication process of academics. Some high-ranking journals now do not only employ a peer-reviewing process to ensure the highest quality of research; they also weigh the potential to attract views and citations in their decisions to publish a piece. The emphasis by funders and university managements on innovation and new patents in synergy with the private sector furthermore ties academia more strongly to private firms that make the bulk of global economy today (Schottenius 2016 ).
In the social sciences, too, engagement with 'stakeholders' (such as policymakers) and 'beneficiaries' (such as local Southern communities) is encouraged throughout the whole research process from design to dissemination, again ensuring relevance and possibilities for direct impact. This influences design of research projects and also the types of research methodologies and contents that are currently favoured. Most importantly in recent years, there has been a push towards both evidence-based policymaking and research based on big data, the latter playing a major role in attempts to predict social events such as 'violent conflicts' in the South and 'riots' in the North and, ultimately, to prevent them (Sandvik et al. 2014; Stottlemyre and Stottlemyre 2013) .
The need to make research relevant pushes academics increasingly to adopt new roles and engage with actors outside of academia such as policymakers and intervention practitioners, but also the media, NGOs, think tanks, consultancies and the like. Yet the impact agenda is not the only reason for this trend. Conflict and intervention researchers are experiencing a reduction of access to their objects of study in several ways. The most noted aspect perhaps is the growing securitisation of research, which is driven by insurance and liability concerns of universities, who prevent their researchers from going to conflict zones (Duffield 2014; Fisher 2017 ).
Other aspects include reduction in funding and time available for field trips and other more time/money-consuming epistemic practices, often justified by funders in terms of value for money. These trends have led to conflict and intervention researchers' increased reliance on information provided by other knowledge producers such as think tanks, consultancies, and local research assistants, or through remote technologies such as the use of mobile phones or Skype to access informants in 'nogo areas'. This puts academics at the centre of knowledge production in neoliberal times and warrants a deeper exploration of, and reflection on, the knowledge practices of a range of actors involved in the provision of knowledge in/about international conflicts and interventions.
Re-reading this special issue through a neoliberal lens
In the following subsections, we present our re-reading of the contributions to this special issue of Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding against the background of the neoliberal developments described above -a re-reading which the authors may not have had in mind when writing their articles and which is entirely our own interpretation and responsibility. We argue that there are three main themes touched upon by all contributions in one form or another: first, conditions and problems of access to information and data; second, practices generating authority for knowledge producing actors and legitimacy for the knowledge bodies produced by them; and third, struggles over competing narratives concerning political problematisations, interpretations and solutions. While these themes are not new, we argue that what is novel about their current dynamics is the neoliberal push against academia in which academic knowledge production is increasingly governmentalized and mainstreamed along the capitalist requirements for reproduction, in which these tasks have to be negotiated and which conditions the practices, techniques and struggles around policy-relevant conflict and intervention knowledge.
Access to data and information in/about zones of conflict and intervention
In neoliberal times, the access to research data and information is limited in at least three distinct ways, which concern the research design including methodologies and methods; physical access to 'the field'; and social access to central formal and informal actors and processes.
In terms of research design, demands of policy relevance and stakeholder involvement, but also dominant narratives about a conflict or intervention that shape policymakers and practitioners' existent imaginaries, generally predetermine which questions are asked, what is seen as a relevant problem to be worked on or researched into, and which methods and approaches are most useful to do so. How research is presented and disseminated is shaped not by the researchers' findings or academic agenda, but by exigencies of the policy world. These tendencies of ever-harder access to 'the field' are mirrored in the described trends in academia, where conflict and intervention researchers are under constraints in terms of insurance, funding and time to keep contact with areas in conflict to a minimum or to access them remotely by making use of new informational technologies. This is highlighted, for example, by Perera (2017) , when she describes how she had to rely on a range of informants due to lack of access to specific areas in Eastern DRC. Likewise, Bake and Zöhrer (2017) Interestingly, at the same time that physical access is ever harder to obtain, the pressure to provide novel insights from the field as a form of academics and experts' self-marketing in an increasingly competitive academic environment has augmented the number of field trips undertaken. In many post-war societies this has led to a 'fieldwork industry', in which 'informants' and 'interview partners' handle a constant influx of researchers of all colours and in which access to the field and to informants and data is commodified (through paying professional travel agencies, fixers, informants etc.) (Bliesemann de Guevara, forthcoming). This raises questions about the kinds of insights that are enabled by such organised, often fleeting and mediated visits to zones of conflict and intervention. The illusion of 'authenticity'
and 'access to unfiltered information' that being on the ground creates is geared more towards international and/or domestic audiences than it is towards gathering 'untainted' facts. As Bliesemann de Guevara (2017) within the dominant public narratives and framings of those researchers and experts set out to study (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kostić, Forthcoming) .
Authority and legitimacy in contemporary conflict knowledge production
In the neoliberal marketplace of ideas, where a high number of actors compete over interpretations of problems and access to policy debates, techniques to augment one's authority to make knowledge claims about specific crises and interventions is seen as just as crucial as the actual content of knowledge. As the contributions in this special issue show, there are different sources of claims to authority to make truth claims in the field of conflict and intervention expertise. State agencies such as intelligence services and quasi-governmental agencies as well as in-house experts of international organisations can claim to have 'insider knowledge' based on large apparatuses of information gathering and exploitation, but their claims are also tainted by the fact that they are close to, or even part of, the state. NGOs and think tanks, by contrast, make their authority claims based on their alleged independence and objectivity, although these claims may be blurred as these organisations are sometimes statefunded (e.g., the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation in Sweden), funded by private capital (e.g., George Soros's Open Society Foundations) and/or openly side with particular parties or ideologies (e.g., the German political party foundations such as the Green Party's Heinrich Böll Foundation). NGOs and think tanks differ, however, from professional consultancies, which offer their intellectual services for profit and are certainly closest to the notion of knowledge markets in its narrow sense.
Academics, finally, are traditionally seen as autonomous in their production of knowledge, but are also said to inhabit an ivory tower with few links to 'reality', therefore barely counting as 'policy experts'. As discussed above, it is this ivorytower existence that neoliberal demands are trying to dismantle by pushing academics to integrate into the knowledge market.
While this overview suggests rather static and clear-cut roles of different kind of experts and knowledge-providing organisations, the reality in neoliberal times looks quite different. An increasing number of individuals do not only change jobs in different sectors, the so-called revolving door phenomenon, but actually hold several positions in different sectors at the same time. This allows them to claim different sources of authority in the process of knowledge production. This type of flexian actors who engage in knowledge production in/about conflict and intervention can claim authority by access to unique information and/or the field, which is often provided either through access to the social networks of actors described above or to the physical information that flexing organisational roles can provide (Kostić 2014 (Kostić , 2017 Wedel 2004 Wedel , 2009 ). In addition, in an ever more proliferating knowledge Sacco, who pays just as much attention to detail, but allows for doubts about informants in his books. It is the genre belonging to each epistemic practice, that is, the human rights report versus the comics book, that decides on whether 'doubt' is an authority-enhancing category. In the case of Sacco, it makes his journalism appear more human, prone to errors. In the case of HRW, doubts are counter-productive as their often forensic-type research has to be 'beyond doubt' to be convincing (in detail Bake and Zöhrer 2017) .
Several contributions look at the role of field presence or 'having been there' as a source of expert authority. In the case of HRW reporting and Sacco's comics journalism, getting as close as possible to the specific location in which something happened is a crucial part of the performance of their methodology and authority (Bake and Zöhrer 2017) . This is also true, however, for academics, as Perera's (2017) auto-ethnography suggests: her claims to truth are based on an extensive fieldwork in the DRC during which she conducted c.200 interviews with a wide range of actors on the ground, trying to collect and triangulate information -with all the difficulties and messiness this entails. Unlike HRW, Perera has tried to voice the messiness of data and ambiguity of findings to her audience of stakeholders in policy circles, but as discussed above this was not appreciated. What the international non-governmental organization HRW, comics journalist Sacco and researcher Perera have in common is that their presence in the field is led by methodological choice and the conviction that data needs to be gathered systematically in the field and as close to the action as possible. By contrast, when politicians undertake on-site visits in zones of conflict and intervention, as explored by Bliesemann de Guevara (2017), the fact of 'having been there' -ideally several times -is enough in most cases to endow the travelling politician with country expertise among peers and public at home.
The example of parliamentarians' on-site visits is an important one, as it clearly raises questions about the authenticity of on-the-ground experience and information and about the truth claims made on their basis, since these visits are so obviously staged and superficial. Nonetheless, as an epistemic practice they are a valuable and legitimate source of authority in discourses about conflict/intervention.
This suggests that the dominance of certain interpretations and narratives over others is not necessarily a function of finding 'facts' or telling 'truth', but that there are other logics at play in competitions over interpretations of conflict and intervention.
Truth claims as struggles over dominant narratives
The proliferation of knowledge producing actors and competing explanations about specific conflicts and interventions raises the question of legitimacy of different truth and knowledge claims in the eyes of national and international audiences, especially policymakers, but also more general publics. There is no such thing as one 'global public', but both international and domestic publics are further split into a number of audiences based on ideology, nationality, issues at stake, belonging to professional communities, and many other factors, which makes convincing, legitimate and trusted knowledge claims all the more difficult (Eriksen and Sending 2013) . Against this background, questions of why some actors are believed more than others, by whom, and based on what kind of techniques and technologies become essential. A majority of contributions in this special issue converges around the idea that practices of narrating, framing, and truth-telling as story-telling take centre-stage in explanations of why certain interpretations of conflict and intervention come to dominate over others at specific points in time.
Narratives bring discrete and unconnected pieces of data, information or 'facts' into a temporal and causal order, which gives them a specific meaning (Ricoeur 1984, preface) . This includes the distribution of roles such as hero, villain and victim and the construction of a clear plot, which usually includes a situation, a disruption, and a solution to restore order. Whether an issue is seen as a political problem at all, and what kind of problem it constitutes, are shaped by policy narratives. Setting the beginning of a story can be crucial for how a situation is interpreted and how roles, responsibilities and normative judgments (such as blame, guilt or honour) are assigned (Gadinger et al. 2014; Stone 1989 Stone , 2002 . For example, Perera (2017) shows how a militia leader can be framed as either a psychopathic barbarian or a 'Braveheart'-type fighter for the rights of his community, depending on where her informants set the starting point and the emphasis of their story about this person. Narratives are a structuring element of political discourses because they help simplify complicated issues. Nonetheless, the inclusion of detail into narratives seems to enhance the impression of authenticity -a phenomenon that has been recognised as in danger of leading to 'ethnographic seduction' in social anthropology (see Perera 2017) . The demands of policy-relevant knowledge tend to lead to a concentration on the here and now, rather than the appreciation of the larger historical context, which again may dilute responsibilities, distort the interpretation of a political issue and thereby prime the policy solutions designed towards it.
Narratives and storytelling are also an integral part of the data collection process -both in the sense of sedimented dominant understandings of a conflict/intervention, but also in the sense of challenging and questioning dominant narratives. Several authors have discussed the role of meta-narratives in different cases in detail. Autesserre (2009 Autesserre ( , 2012 and Koddenbrock (2014) , for instance, both point to 'resource curse', 'rape as a weapon of war', and 'corrupt elites' as the dominant, simplifying narratives that shape policymakers and practitioners' imaginaries of and intervention in the DRC, and Dunn (2003) shows that these imaginaries have deeper historical roots. In a similar vein, Todorova ( by different sides to argue against the other, but is actually actively created, manipulated and employed in specific ways and at specific times to gain the upper hand. This type of knowledge production is best understood in terms of strategic knowledge, knowledge that is produced and used for very specific, non-negotiable aims (Miskimmon et al. 2013; Rosselle et al. 2014 ).
Strategic knowledge production and battles over narratives cannot only be found among members of the international community in zones of conflict and intervention, but also among Southern governments. Lewis (2017) shows that governments of authoritarian states resort to a range of techniques to shape and control discourses involving their political actions or their countries. These include the production of hegemonic discourses domestically in order to ensure legitimacy of their political power; the control of knowledge production about internal conflict and through representation of alternative voices globally; by controlling the physical access to the conflict area (see also Fisher 2017); and by re-contextualising knowledge in order to fit with competing discourses in the international system, such as the competition between human rights discourse (international law) and terrorism discourse (international security).
While the construction of narratives and storylines based on a range of knowledge claims is a pervasive feature of national and international policymaking, the practices on which they are based range on a continuum from fairly open-ended argumentation and representation of different societal interests to strategic manufacturing to reach non-negotiable aims. Looking 'behind the scenes' in order to determine the nature of competition over narrative domination is thus an important but difficult task. The conditions of knowledge production in neoliberal times to a certain extent help uncovering the hidden practices through whistle-blowers and investigative journalists -such as the insights enabled through WikiLeaks, Snowdon or the Panama papers. Yet the neoliberal times also make politics more decentralised and non-transparent than ever, making it more difficult for academics to look behind the curtains of public representations.
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Conclusion: reclaiming research autonomy in neoliberal times
Concluding, we offer some reflections of what our discussion means for academic researchers of conflict and intervention and where to go from here. In this article, we argued that neoliberalism has squeezed academic research autonomy in a variety of ways, ranging from demands to produce knowledge that is useful to politics to the structural changes impacting on funding decisions and academic promotions (impact agenda, bibliometrics etc.) and to the increasing limits to physical or social access to 'the field'. In our view, these are problematic developments increasingly preventing academics from engaging with research questions and methodologies that are located outside of these neoliberal logics.
If our discussion and the analyses presented in the contributions to this special issue have shown one thing, however, it is that scholars of conflict and intervention need to ask more (and more radical) questions about the conditions under which they work and which simultaneously impact on their 'object of study', the international politics of conflict and intervention. Highlighting the ways in which the forces of neoliberalism are influencing our field, through direct demands such as the ones regarding the impact agenda and more indirectly through changes in the structural conditions of academic knowledge production, will not enable us to fully reclaim academia from the grasp of these neoliberal forces. Yet, reflexivity, and the forms of critique it enables, promises to keep the struggle for more research autonomy alive.
In order to overcome the vocabulary and frames set by the fields of politics and economics, conflict and intervention research needs to ask more radical questions about the evolving nature and practices of international politics today and about its own entanglement with this reality. With this article, we hope to have made a contribution to the debate and offered some ideas of what questions need to be asked to enable academic research to keep pushing the boundaries and maintain space for autonomy and critique in neoliberal times. 2 An example of this problem is the debate about foreign powers trying to influence the US elections through hacking and publishing emails of the members of Hillary Clinton's team (Ashkens 2017 ).
